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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
REX L. GEORGE and MARGARET 
,\. <U~ORGE, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
STANLEY C. MANN and LOUISE 
S. MANN, his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
\ 
Case No. 
11109 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for a sum claimed to be owing pur-
~uant to a contract of sale of real property located in 
Davis County, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
'rlte case was tried to the Court. All facts and per-
li nPn t documents were submitted as exhibits to the Court 
2 
on stipulation of the parties, and the Court received 
written memoranda and oral arguments of counsel. From 
a judgment in favor of the defendants, no cause of action , 
plaintiffs appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in their favor in the amount of $3,600.84 together 
with interest and costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts were stipulated by the parties hereto (R. 
21-23), and are set out below for the convenience of this 
Court: 
1. On the 29th day of October, 1959, the Defendant8 
entered into an agret'ment styled "Option and Contract to 
Purchase Real Property" with the mother of the Defend-
ant, NELLIE C. MANN, concerning real property lo-
cated at vVoods Cross, Davis County, Utah. A copy of 
this agreement is attached lwreto as Exhibit "A" and 
made a part hereof as though set out herein verbatim. 
2. The said option and contract to purchase pro-
vided, among othPr things, that Dt>fendants were to pa.1· 
to the said NELLlE C .. MANN the sum of $100.00 on 
3 
2\ ovemhP r 10th of each year until the option was exer-
e i~Nl or until it expired; that the option had to be exer-
cis<·d on or lwforp the] st day of N overnber, 1963, at 12 :00 
\Toon. 
~). That in September of 1961, Plaintiffs and De-
ft'ndants began negotiations for the purchase of the prop-
Piiy by the Plaintiffs from the Defendants which is the 
suh;jed of the option (Exhibit "A"). The negotiations 
11 Pn' lmndl<:>d mainly through a real estate agency in 
Bountiful, Davis County, Utah, who had been employed 
by tlt<' DPfondants to secure a buyer for the property. 
+. '!'hat the parties entered into and signed a docu-
llll'nt mtitled "I<~arnest 1Joney Receipt and Offer to Pur-
(·lias(»'' prepared h~v the real estate agent, which is attach-
(·d lwreto as }{;xhihit "B" and made a part hereof a:s 
though set out herein vPrbatirn. 
;J. 'rhat this "Earnest Money RPceipt and Offer to 
Pnrchasp" providPd that tlw total purchase price of the 
prnpt•l'ty was to bP $33,000.00; and provided, further, that 
Uw lJUrchasP price was to he paid as follmvs: $100.00 as 
a <lqiosit at the time the "Earnest Money Receipt and 
OiTPr to Purchase" was signed, $GOO.OO when the seller 
<qiprnye<l the sale, and $(),000.00 on delivery of the deed 
(!J I inal eontrad of sale \Yhich was to lw on or hefore the 
i 't. da:< of N owmlwr 19G1, and $100.00 per year cornrnenc-
111.!.'. \oY<'mlier, Hhi2 until November, 196+, at no intere::;t; 
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thereafter $2,000.00 per year plus 5 % interest on th(' 
balance which "would amount to the assignment of option 
on said property." It further provided that "this offer 
contingent upon buyer being able to sell home at 1100 
South 8th West, Woods Cross, U t1ah, to net him $6,000.00 
before November 1, 1961." 
6. That the Defendants signed, in duplicate, a docu 
ment dated the 1st day of November, 1961, and titled and 
styled, "Assignment of Contract"; the original of which 
was signed by STANLEY C. MANN and LOUISE S. 
MANN, the Defendants, and is attached hereto as Exhibit 
"C" and made a part hereof as though set out herein ver-
batim and the carbon copy signed by the same individuals 
and is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and made a part 
hereof a;s though set out herein verbatim. The carbon 
copy was retained by the Defendants. 
7. That the said documents contain the handwrittm 
provision in ink: "Subject to conditions on EarnPst 
Money Receipt." 
8. That the original of said document was received 
by the Plaintiffs from the real estate agency and the 
carbon copy was retained by the Defendants; that the pro-
vision "subject to condition on Earnest 1\foney Receipt,'' 
was on the original when it was received by the Plaintiffs 
(Exhibit "C") and also appears on the Defendants' copy 
(Exhibit "D"), hut Defendant, S'T' ANLEY C. MANN, 
denif~S that he wrote it on the documents. 
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9. That on or about the 22nd day of December, 1961, 
a do<'urnent entitled "Real Estate Contract," was signed 
h:-- >l"Pllie C. Mann, the motlwr of the Defendant S'TAN-
L~~y C. l\IANN, \\'ho was residing with the Defendants 
in tlw ~tate of California at the time and the Plaintiffs, 
as Luyers of the property which is the subject of the case. 
rrhis document is attached hereto as (Exhibit "E") and 
rnadP a 1Jart hereof as though set out herein verbatim. 
10. That J~xhibit "E" provides for the sale of the 
property by NELLIE C. 1Vf ANN directly to the Plaintiffs. 
1J. Pursuant to the terms of the "Earnest Money 
R('CPiIJt and Offer to Purchase," Plaintiffs paid the sum 
of $100.00 as a deposit' the swn of $600.00 when the seller 
approvPd the sale and the sum of $6,000.00 subsequent 
tu or at the tim0 of the signing of Exhibit "E." 
12. That in December, 1961, an "Assignment of 
Option and Contract to Purehase Real Property," a copy 
of which is attaclwd h0reto as Exhibit "F," and incorpo-
ratt>d lwr0in by reference, was prepared. A copy of said 
rnntrad was forwarded to Defendants in California with 
tlw signatures of the Plaintiffs affixed as Second Parties. 
As to \Yhether or not this document was signed by the 
Deft>ndants and returned, the parties do not recall. 
1 :l. Exhibit "l1J," heretofore referred to was pre-
f ·al'<'(l Ji~· Attorney GEORGE K. FADEL, copies were 
mailed to NELLIE C. MANN in California, who signed 
the same and returned the copies. 
14. That Plaintiffs had paid to NELLIE C. ~IAXX, 
or heirs, the sum of $3,G00.84 in interest for the 1wriod 
running from the 22nd day of Decemher, 1961, to tlw 1st 
day of N ovemhe-r, 196-!, pursuant to Exhihit "E." 
The original of the stipulation and its exhibits have 
been lost, but copies have been substituted. All exhibits 
mentioned in the Stipulation are in the record (R. 2-1-35), 
and should be carefully examined by the Court in connec-
tion with a review of the facts and consideration of the 
argument. 
ARGTThIENT 
POINT I 
IT WAS THE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES THAT 
THE PLAINTIFFS WERE TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY 
FROM THE DEFENDANTS AND NOT l\IERELY TO TAKE 
DEFENDANTS' OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PROPERTY. 
In examining the contract hetween the parties tlIP 
Court should bP gi.1ided hy the principle that the intPn-
tion of tlw parties must he dt>t<'nnined and foIIow('d. 
·western DerclojJ!lle11t Compa1111I'.1\'ell,-! Utah 2nd 11~; 
:!88 P.2d -152 (19;"'>5). 
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At tlw time negotiations began, defendants had no 
intc·rest in the property, hut held only an option to pur-
cliasP Exhibit "A" (R. 2+-26). No Utah case on this point 
lta:s be(•Jl located but there are respectable authorities 
from other jurisdictions which hold that one having a 
mPn' option to purchase real property has not, before the 
1·xen·isP of th(_• option, any interest in real estate. Vigars 
r. 1!111ci11s, 1G9 N:W. 119 (Iowa). See also the California 
i'ase of Hicks v. Christensen, 164 Pac. 395, which defines 
an option as a mere right to purchase property, and not 
as an interest in property itself. The "Earnest Money 
RPceipt and Offer to Purchase," Exhibit B (R. 27), which 
was tlw initial document entered into by the parties here-
in, indicates dearly that this was a sale of real property 
and not a mere assignment or !'ale of the option, since 
l~xl1iliit B states that the paynwnts were to be made" ... 
on clPliwry of dt>ed or final contract of sale" (lines 14 and 
13, l•~xhihit B, R. 27), also at liDP 37 of Exhibit B (R. 27) 
" ... final conveyance by warranty deed" is mentioned, 
mid in tlw body of this same document the defendant, 
:-;tanley C. l\lann, has \Vritten that ''Release of 1 acre 
frontagp of 100 feet is contingent upon completion of 
~alt>." (R. 27) This all shows that the parties herein did 
not intend that the plaintiffs WPre to receive a mere as-
~iµ;i1111ent of the option. Because the contract was for a sale 
111' l'Pal property rather than for the assignment of the 
11ptio11, it would have hePn nC'cessary for the defendants 
111 c·'.:t'l'PisP tlw option with Nellie C. l\fann, Exhibit A 
1 I~. 2+-2fi), and tlwn makP a salt> of the property to the 
11l:ii11til'!'s: or ill tlw alternative, they could have allowed 
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the plaintiffs to enter into a direct contract with thl· 
owner of the property, Mrs. Nellie C. Mann, for the pm-
chase of the property, and then fulfill their other contrac-
tual obligations separately. They did allow the plaintiff~ 
to enter into a contract ·with Nellie C. Mann for tlw pm-
chase of the property (See Exhibit 11~ R. 30-3-t), but thPy 
have refused to fulfill the remainder of their obliga-
tions-notably to reimburse plaintiffs for interest 
charged in connection with thP sale before N owmber 1. 
1964. 
The effect of Exhibit A, the option to purchase the 
property from Nellie C. Mann, which was in force at tlw 
time was such that the plaintiffs could not have enterPd 
into 1a contract with Nellie C. l\fann to purchase without 
the acquiescence and knowledg·e of the defendants. 'T'liP 
defendants did have full lrnO\Yledge of the ])articulars 
hen1 sin re Nellie C. Mann is the mother of the defendant, 
Stanley C. Mann, and she was residing with the dPfend-
ants in California at the time and received the contract 
of sale for her signature at the same time that the defend-
ants received their final payment on their contract with 
the plailllitiffs, Stipulation No. 9 (R. 22). 
The "I~arnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase", 
Exhibit B (R. 27), provides that the transaction was to 
be closed on or hef'on' N ovemlwr l, 1961, hut Exhibib 
"C" and '' D" ( H. 2S and 29) show that the parties in-
tended to waivP tlii:-; provision as to the date of clo:-;in:.; 
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since these instruments are dated November 1, 1961, and 
ineoqJorate by reference the provisions of the Earnest 
.Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, Exhibit B (R. 27). 
Since the provisions were incorporated by reference it is 
dear that the parties intended to have the closing of the 
~ale PX tended beyond November 1, 1961. One of the pro-
visions of the contract of sale was to the effect that the 
plaintiffs would not be required to pay initerest on the 
amount to be paid for the purchase of the property until 
after November 1, 1964. 
lf there is any ambiguity present in this contra.et 
it is elementary that the writing should be construed 
against the party drawing same, i.e., the defendants.Beal 
11. Tayco, Inc., 16 Utah 2nd 323 400 P.2d 503 (1965). 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFFS' ENTERING INTO A CONTRACT TO PUR-
CHASE THE PROPERTY FROM NELLIE C. MANN, THE 
OWNER OF SAME, WAS WITHIN THE DEFENDANTS' 
KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND AMOUNTED 
ONLY TO THE EXERCISE OF THE OPTION HAD IT BEEN 
ASSIGNED TO THE PLAINTIFFS BY THE DEFENDANTS 
AND THEREFORE SATISFIED ONLY A PART OF THE 
DEFENDANTS' CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION TO THE 
PLAINTIFFS. 
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It is true that the plaintiffs enterP<l into a dirert 
contract of sale with Nellie C. l\Iann for the purclias(' of 
the property, Exhihit E, Stipulation 10 (R. 22), hut th(·y 
<lid this i1n sz;ite of dPfendant's option to purchase the rPa[ 
property in question, and it \ms done with the knowledµ:1· 
of the defendants and thPir acquiescence, since1 Nellie C. 
Mann was residing with them in California at tlw 
time she signed the agreement and at the same time that 
the defendants recf'iwd their final payment. (R. 22). 
The eon tract of the plaintiffs with Nellie C. 1\fann, 
1£xhibit (R. 30-34) of necessity had to follow the provi-
sions of the option, Exhibit A, (R. 2-l--2G), and tlw plain-
tiffs were not ahle to receive any more Favorable contra('( 
directly with Mrs. Nellie l\fann than the defendants <'onld 
have done in exercising tht'ir option. ThereforP the de-
fendants are responsihlP to the plaintiffs for a·ll.\' addi-
tional benefits they contracted to deliver to the plaintiffs 
over and ahov\-~ those which could he satisfit'd lJy exerC'isc 
or thP assigrn1wnt of tlw option. 
Under tlw option and the contract which grew ont 
of the exercise of the option it was nPcessary to pay tlw 
interest to Nellie C. l\lann from tlw 22nd day of DPee11ilwr, 
l9f>1, to the lst da)' of NovemhPr, 19()-1-, hut tl1e eontrad 
hetw0en the parti(•s prnvidPd Pxplieitly that if tlH· plain 
tiffs 1rnn·hasP<1 tl1c> propPrty tlH'.\' "-onld not hP rPquin·1l 
to pa.\· intn\'st until ;1l't(•r :\'on•1!!lH'i' 1, 19G-l-, Exl1iliit 
B (H. :ti). ~in<''' i1 i:-: rn1fk]lt'1z·:1 tl1nt t!iP plaintiff's paid 
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the sum of $3,600.84 between the 22nd day of December 
19Gl and the 1st day of November, 1964, Stipulation 14 
(R. 23), they are entitled to judgment for this amount 
togPther with interest, since this was clearly the intention 
of the parties herein. 
CONCLUSION 
The stipulation and exhibits of the parties on file 
herPi'll show that the intention of the parties was to the 
effect that the defendants were to sell real property to 
the plaintiffs. One of the provisions in the contract of 
~ale was to the effect that the plaintiffs would not be 
required to pay any interest om the unpaid balance of the 
i''ale price until after N overnber 1, 1964. This they were 
required to do, not because of any contract which they 
Pntered into, but rather because of a contractual obliga-
tion of the dPfendants to NPllie C. Mann. 
The intention of the parties at the time they entered 
in lo the contract dictates that the judgment of the District 
Court in favor of the defendants should be reversed and 
.indgment entered in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount 
of $3,G00.84 together with interest and costs. 
R<>spectfully submitted, 
S. MARK .JOHNSON 
Attorney for Plaintiffs arnd 
Appellants 
170 West 4th South 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
